At his first formal assembly since becoming a member of the Rastriya Swatantra Get together as its “senior chief” and the presumptive Prime Minister, additionally ex-mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan Metropolis Balendra Shah, requested rhetorically, “Isn’t Janakpur the capital of the province? Why go to Kathmandu if it’s the capital? Why can’t the entire work be accomplished right here?’ He then delivered the punchline to make clear his social gathering’s dedication to federalism: “Due to this fact, the province must be strengthened so that residents don’t should go to Kathmandu.” Nonetheless, federalism is interpreted otherwise in numerous settings.
Within the sanitised seminars of Kathmandu and the smoke-filled tea retailers of Janakpur, federalism means various things. Within the capital, it’s usually diminished to a query of fiscal transfers to “subordinate businesses” and administrative effectivity—in essence, not even devolution however mere decentralisation.
This text is part of The Hindu’s e-book: Nepal’s new political second
Within the plains and the hills past the Ring Highway, it’s about identification, empowerment and dignity. The disjuncture between these two imaginations explains why, even a decade after the promulgation of the Structure of 2015, federalism in Nepal stays a venture below contestation somewhat than a settled compact.
Ex-mayor Shah’s dedication to stronger provinces is diametrically reverse to his earlier place of federalism. In 2022, he had voted in elections for the federal parliament however skipped casting his poll for the provincial meeting. The Rastriya Swatantra Get together, of which he’s now a senior chief, hadn’t fielded its candidates in provincial elections. It appears that the social gathering has realised that the constituency for federalism in Nepal is so robust that no political social gathering with nationwide ambition can afford to disregard it regardless of their centralist convictions.
Unitary Reflex
The demand for federal restructuring didn’t emerge from a donor’s toolkit, as some remnants of the monarchist order allege, nor solely from a Maoist manifesto, as its later proponents typically indicate. Its mental family tree reaches again to the Nineteen Fifties, when Raghunath Thakur started articulating the structural marginalisation of the Madhesh—the northern extension of the Gangetic plains, stretching east to west alongside Nepal’s border with West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Within the transient democratic interlude following the autumn of the Rana regime, Thakur argued {that a} extremely centralised Kathmandu couldn’t authentically characterize a rustic outlined by a number of languages, castes and areas. His name was not for secession, however for lodging inside a extra inclusive state and justice for Madhesh.
But Thakur’s warnings have been quickly swept apart. The 1960 royal-military coup by King Mahendra buried the delicate democratic experiment below the burden of an authoritarian imaginative and prescient. The Panchayat regime’s catechism— “one language, one gown; one king, one nation,” reflecting the monoethnic dominance of the hegemonic Khas-Arya group—did greater than dissolve parliament; it sacralised uniformity. The division of the nation into 14 zones and 75 districts was an train in administrative cartography, not political devolution. Federalism was recast as treason. For twenty years, even the very vocabulary of autonomy was erased from official discourse.
Cultural geography
The early Nineteen Eighties cracked open this enforced silence. The Harka Gurung report on inner migration, although technocratic in intent, uncovered the asymmetries between hills and plains. It supplied empirical legitimacy to what the peripheries had lengthy intuited: The state’s improvement mannequin was structurally skewed.
Gajendra Narayan Singh, a dedicated cadre of the Nepali Congress, seized the second. By the Nepal Sadbhavana Parishad, he proposed a three-province mannequin—Mountain, Hill, and Terai—breaking together with his former social gathering affiliation to pursue what he known as a politics of dignity. His imaginative and prescient was modest in scale however radical in implication: a geographically grounded federalism that mirrored the contours of tradition throughout Nepal. From east to west, the life of the Himalayan area aligned intently with Tibetan practices; the peoples of the mountains and valleys of the Mahabharata ranges adhered to the Sanatan religion, which stretches from Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand within the west to Sikkim and Assam within the east. In the Ganga plains, the worldwide border cuts by means of communities that share language, tradition, and historical past. For the primary time since Thakur, federal restructuring was positioned firmly on the nationwide agenda.
But the 1990 Structure, born of the Individuals’s Motion, opted for continuity over rupture. The restored multiparty system retained the unitary structure. Even Singh, constrained by the calls for of parliamentary arithmetic, tempered his federal insistence in favour of incremental inclusion. Liberalism arrived and sovereignty shifted from the king to the folks, however the state’s construction remained Panchayat in all however identify. Majoritarianism diminished parliament to an instrument of the Khas Arya elite—a bunch of Brahman-Kshetriyas from Gorkhali Court docket that had retained its maintain over the polity and society of the nation for 250 years and advanced into the Everlasting Institution of Nepal (PEON).
Renewed aspirations
The Maoist insurgency (1996–2006) detonated the controversy. By linking federalism to self-determination, the rebels reframed it from an administrative reform to a query of historic justice. Their proposal of autonomous ethnic and regional items—modelled loosely on the Chinese language system—was much less about comparative constitutionalism and extra about mobilisation. Janajatis and Madhesis heard, maybe for the primary time, a promise that the map of Nepal might mirror their names.
Sarcastically, the 2007 Interim Structure, drafted within the euphoria of peace, initially omitted the phrase “federalism.” It was a rare act of structural amnesia. The Madhesh rebellion that adopted, led by figures akin to Upendra Yadav, compelled a constitutional modification committing Nepal to a federal democratic republic. Federalism was not gifted; it was extracted.
The primary Constituent Meeting (2008–2012) turned a theatre of irreconcilable visions. On one aspect stood proponents of identity-based federalism—Maoists and Madhesh-based events—advocating provinces like Limbuwan, Tamsaling and Madhesh. On the opposite have been the Nepali Congress and Communist Get together of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist)—higher recognized merely as UML—insisting on “capability-based” demarcation grounded in financial viability and useful resource distribution.
An ethnic Madhesi man holds a banner that reads “Hail Madhesh Hail Madhesi. Black Day,” throughout a protest towards the nation’s new structure saying lawmakers ignored their considerations over how state borders must be outlined, in Birgunj, Nepal, Sunday, Sept. 20, 2015. The brand new structure changed an interim one which was purported to be in impact for under a couple of years however ruled the nation since 2007. Police mentioned clashes between officers and protesters on Sunday left one demonstrator lifeless close to Birgunj city in southern Nepal.
| Photograph Credit score:
AP
This was not a technical disagreement over boundaries. It was a battle over narrative possession. Naming a province after an indigenous neighborhood signified historic recognition; basing it alongside artificially drawn boundaries to take care of the dominance of Khas-Arya signified a continuity of the state’s civilisational grammar. The impasse proved deadly. The Meeting dissolved with out delivering a structure.
The second Constituent Meeting inherited the identical fault traces. It took the 2015 earthquake and a decisive intervention by the Supreme Court docket of Nepal to compel the political class into compromise. The 16-point pact amongst the main events had fast-tracked a seven-province mannequin, suspending contentious problems with naming and boundary delineation. Federalism was institutionalised, however its ideological core was diluted. It took one other order of the Supreme Court docket for the signatories of the 16-point pact to include federalism with numbers as an alternative of names within the structure.
The provinces have been born as numbered orphans—Province 1, Province 2, and so forth. The following wrestle over naming revealed that the identity-capability schism had merely been deferred.
River-based names akin to Koshi, Gandaki and Karnali have been celebrated by the institution as impartial and pragmatic. For identification actions, they echoed the Panchayat-era choice for sacral geography over lived historical past. In Province 2, nevertheless, the adoption of “Madhesh” marked a uncommon triumph of political assertion over cartographic warning. Lumbini, invoking the Buddha’s birthplace, supplied a civilisational compromise that prevented ethnic specificity whereas satisfying symbolic urge for food.
These naming battles weren’t semantic indulgences. In a post-conflict society, onomastics is politics. To call is to assert.
The current unease with Nepal’s federal construction is palpable. A decade into implementation, the system displays a peculiar asymmetry: hyper lively native governments, an assertive centre, and provinces suspended in jurisdictional limbo. The federal paperwork maintains a direct line from Singha Durbar to the 753 native items, usually bypassing provincial authorities. Fiscal federalism stays centralised, whereas policing and civil service administration are contested domains that proceed below federal management regardless of constitutional provisions for provincial switch.
This “middle-layer uncertainty”—a wineglass somewhat than even hourglass mannequin of federalism the place nominal provincial stage have been given duty with out corresponding authority—fuels up to date populism. Within the run-up to the March 2026 elections, leaders akin to Balendra Shah spoke of empowered provinces whereas implying that the centre will stay the final word arbiter of identification and status. The rhetoric of effectivity—provinces are too costly, too cumbersome—reframes a constitutional query as a budgetary inconvenience.
The clamour for a instantly elected chief government continues to reverberate, now fuelled by a brand new technology of political actors. Parallel to this, the demand for instantly elected Chief Ministers is gaining traction within the provinces. Whereas proponents promise this can treatment the ‘coalition illness’ and convey stability, critics worry the creation of seven mini monarchs—leaders who may replicate Kathmandu’s centralising impulse at an area scale. With out strong provincial legislatures and a tradition of oversight, this shift towards government personalisation dangers hollowing out deliberative federalism, turning provinces into private fiefdoms somewhat than democratic laboratories.
Placing Collectively
Comparative federalism distinguishes between “coming collectively,” “holding collectively,” and “placing collectively” fashions. Nepal’s experiment seems closest to the final: a construction assembled below strain to pacify the road somewhat than the fruits of a consensual compact. The hazard of such an origin is persistent fragility.
Three spectres hang-out the present panorama. The effectivity entice reduces rights to accounting. The chief fetish privileges personalities over establishments. The identification deficit leaves the grievances that birthed federalism solely partially addressed. If provinces grow to be mere administrative outposts—liable for service supply however devoid of substantive autonomy—the system dangers regression to a digitalised unitary state.
But federalism is just not with out resilience. Provincial assemblies have begun to domesticate distinct political cultures. Karnali asserts a story of natural marginality; Madhesh sustains a vigilant regional consciousness. Institutional habits, as soon as fashioned, will not be simply erased.
The long run hinges on whether or not the end result of the 2026 electoral cycle, which resulted in a decisive win for the RSP, will deepen provincial legitimacy or will reinforce central tutelage. Federalism’s promise was twin: self-rule for range, shared rule for unity. In observe, Nepal has achieved partial decentralisation with out full partnership.
The query earlier than the republic is due to this fact not whether or not federalism has failed, however whether or not it has been allowed to mature. If the centre continues to deal with provinces as contractual workers somewhat than constitutional equals, the experiment will stagnate. If political actors embrace the friction of real power-sharing, federalism could but evolve from a contested compromise right into a lived actuality. Nepal has moved from a unitary state to a state of provinces. The unfinished process is to grow to be a federal nation—the place Janakpur doesn’t require Kathmandu’s permission to think about itself, and the place shared rule is just not a ceremonial go to to the capital, however an institutional proper embedded in on a regular basis governance.
Opposition to federalism has acquired a definite ideological backbone. The most vocal critics emerge from three overlapping constituencies. First are monarchist nostalgics, who look again to the pre-1990 order as an period of certainties—one king, one command, one canon of belonging. For them, federalism represents not merely administrative fragmentation however the symbolic dethronement of a civilisational hierarchy by which the palace served as each fountainhead and firewall.
The second bloc is the Hindutva foyer, transnational in sentiment if not construction, which views Nepal’s federal and secular republicanism as a historic aberration from a putative Hindu Rashtra. Of their narrative, provincial autonomy dilutes sacred geography and opens house for plural identities that compete with homogenised spiritual nationalism.
The third strand includes cultural conservatives inside the conventional elite who could publicly settle for republicanism however stay instinctively wedded to a centralised state. Their discomfort with identity-assertive provinces—whether or not Madhesh, Limbuwan, or Tharuhat—stems from a deeper nervousness: political recognition of subnational identities completely recalibrates social energy.
These strands converge in a standard chorus: federalism is pricey, divisive, and externally imposed. Provinces are portrayed as redundant intermediaries between a succesful centre and dynamic native governments. The implicit proposition is obvious: strengthen Singha Durbar, empower municipalities, and let the provincial tier wither into ceremonial existence.
This isn’t a frontal assault on the structure; it’s a technique of attrition. Starve the provinces of fiscal autonomy, delay the operationalisation of provincial police, centralise the civil service, and federalism survives in textual content however expires in observe. Such “nominal federalism” affords the aesthetic of decentralisation with out the substance of shared sovereignty.
Set towards this scepticism stands a extra grounded, if regionally concentrated, help base. Nowhere is the emotive funding in federalism stronger than in Madhesh. For a lot of within the plains, the creation of a province named Madhesh was not a technocratic adjustment however a psychological rupture with centuries of condescension. Even the place materials transformation has been modest—industrial stagnation persists, youth outmigration continues—the symbolic capital of recognition issues. Seeing one’s linguistic and cultural idiom mirrored in provincial establishments generates a way of presence within the republic. Federalism, on this studying, is much less about instant distributive positive aspects and extra about constitutional dignity. It indicators that the Madheshi citizen is just not a peripheral topic petitioning the centre, however a co-owner of the state. Chief Ministers have begun not solely to lament their powerlessness however to stake claims upon the constitutional order. The Kantipur Conclave in February, 2026 noticed all seven Chief Ministers lamenting that they continue to be “orphans of the statute,” missing management over their very own police and civil servants whereas the centre stays obsessive about “administrative cartography.”
This asymmetry has profound electoral implications. Whereas federalism remained on the poll, the parliamentary elections weren’t a referendum on the summary desirability of provincial construction however on the trajectory of federalism. A mandate formed by monarchist nostalgia, Hindutva consolidation, and cultural conservatism would have doubtless accelerated the drift towards a powerful centre flanked by competent native governments—
environment friendly municipalities delivering providers whereas provinces stay fiscally dependent and administratively constrained. Conversely, a verdict rewarding events dedicated to clarifying provincial competencies, finishing fiscal devolution, and institutionalising provincial policing and civil service constructions might have initiated a second-generation reform. However now with the RSP successful the elections, the end result is unclear.
Finally, the selection earlier than the citizens within the run-up to the elections was structural somewhat than sentimental. It was a call about the place sovereignty ought to reside in a multinational society: concentrated in a revitalised centre promising order or dispersed throughout constitutionally empowered provinces demanding negotiation.
Federalism in Nepal was born of wrestle, compromise, and urgency. Whether or not it matures right into a secure structure of shared rule or regresses into an ornamental appendix will rely much less on rhetorical flourish and extra on the arithmetic of the poll.
The Fall Protests of September 2025—triggered by the social media ban— which toppled the earlier authorities, launched a brand new and impatient citizens. The digital rage of the TikTok technology lacks the tenacity of the sluggish, restrained, and traditionally grounded dignity sought by the Madhesh and Janajati actions. Nepal’s Gramscian interregnum has a twist: the new can’t be born, and the previous is preventing to retain primacy. The end result of the 2026 elections could not settle the argument definitively, however the RSP’s insurance policies will decide whether or not the republic advances towards substantive federalism or retreats into a well-known, centralised consolation zone wearing federal apparel—participatory in type, however unitary in substance.
C.Okay. Lal is a senior journalist and political columnist in Nepal